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Justice as Play
by Jack L. Sammons*
Although we are many, we shall speak concisely. Answer us verse for
verse by taking turns. Tell us, first, if you killed your mother.
Aeschylus, Eumenides 585-871

I am interested here in using Johannes Huizinga's work on play,
Homo Ludens, to explore a strange, yet civilizing, phenomenon. Why
do we take those social disputes in our ordinary lives that often seem
most serious and therefore most divisive, turn them over to playful
participants in a legal game, and then choose, more or less, to call the
outcome of this game justice and to trust it as such even to the point of
preferring it to the political? Why, that is, do we think that it is justice
that arises from this play?
This inquiry is not quite as broad as it may seem, for the justice I
have in mind here is the justice that is carried as an internal good of the
legal conversation. It is not the justice we might mean when we say a
law or an action or a person is just or when we use the word justice in
many of its other forms. It is, however, rather closely related to what we
mean when we say that a society is a just one. The justice here is the
justice of justice was done, but in the procedural sense of doing that
refers to the legal conversation's having gone well on its own terms. It
is, in other words, the justice best described, and most admired by
lawyers as advocates, with reference to the manner in which a particular

* Griffin B. Bell Professor of Law, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law.
Duke University (B.A., 1967); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1974); Antioch
School of Law (M.A.T., 1978). My thanks to the following for comments, editing,
conversations on related themes, and encouragement: Linda Edwards, Allan Hutchinson,
Arthur Jacobsen, Mark Jones, Valentin Leppert, Hal Lewis, Karen Sneddon, Joseph
Vining, James Boyd White, and most especially Herbert Tucker.
1. AEsCHYLUS, EUMENIDES 585-87 (458 BC) quoted in DEREK COLLINS, MASTER OF THE
GAME: COMPETITION IN GREEK POETRY 27 (2004).
2. J. HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY-ELEMENT IN CULTURE (Beacon

Press 1955) (1949).
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legal dispute was resolved through the conversation for which these
lawyers are primarily responsible. By definingjustice this way, I do not
suggest that only lawyers appreciate this justice or that it is only a
lawyer's justice. For the ideals of the legal conversation are accepted by
our community, for the most part, as providing something it is willing
to call justice.
When members of our community complain of a legal judgment, as
they often do, they do so legitimately by faulting in some way the legal
conversation that produced it: a violation of a rule, a failure of some of
the participants to be true to their roles, or some claim about the playing
field not being level. Of course there are those within our community
who insist that the justice carried by the legal conversation is not justice
at all and that they know what the outcome of legal disputes should be
in some manner external to it. Often theirs are the voices that seem to
dominate popular culture, but I would insist that even popular culture
recognizes this form of justice and bemoans its absence, for example, in
other cultures.
As the use of the term playing field may have revealed, I will argue
that this justice depends for its recognition as a form of justice, and thus
for its civilizing effect, upon being play and game in Huizinga's terms.3
While this claim may initially seem perfectly compatible with Huizinga's
work, it is instead a challenge to it. For Huizinga, I think, is not at all
sure what to make of the relationship between justice-in which he
discerns, with a force of seriousness that "whelms" the question4 of what
is play and what is not, a true and overarching "moral content"'-and
the modern lawsuit which, while it retains certain praiseworthy Greek
agonistic elements, he thinks most resembles the unrestrained, indeed
unruly, rhetoric of the Roman lawsuit.6 It is a "verbal battle," Huizinga
says;7 and while it includes elements of play, it is not for him true play

3. See generally id. Because Huizinga sometimes changes what he means by game, I
will also be relying here on the definition of game provided in BERNARD SUITS, THE
GRASSHOPPER: GAMES, LIFE, AND UTOPIA (David R. Godine, Pub., Inc. 1990) (1978).
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal],
using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use
of more efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where

the rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity [lusory
attitude].
Id. at 41 (brackets in original). The central element is the lusory attitude, "the element
which unifies the other elements into a single formula." Id. at 35.
4. HUIZINGA, supra note 2, at 213.
5. Id. at 210.
6. Id. at 87.
7. Id. at 78, 84.
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nor capable of play's civilizing influence upon culture that he so
admires.' He is not at all sure that there is a good internal to this
verbal battle by virtue of which we should call its outcome justice.9
There are, I am certain, other ways of reading Huizinga's Homo
Ludens on this subject. (His thoughts on law and play occur only in one
short early chapter, 0 and he never returns to the subject, as he does
most of his others-not even in the overviews of the concluding
chapters.) Nevertheless, what I have just said seems the most straightforward reading of him on the relationship of law to play, and the one
most consistent with what he says about the relationship of play to other
modern activities."
Notice that when Huizinga says law he means
lawsuit or, as I have termed it, the legal conversation. It is important
to what follows here to recognize the difference; for we are not discussing
the state's creation and enforcement of social rules (and whether or not
they are just ones), but the process by which the meanings of those rules
are determined for their enforcement: a conversational process that
operates as a restraint on the state's use of force, as a reduction of the
general to the particular, and as a continuation of the rhetorician's
ancient fear of written law.'"
The trouble Huizinga has in seeing justice as an internal good of the
legal conversation is obviously a very old one. When he says that "[ilt
is the moral content of an action that makes it serious," he is talking
about combat,"3 and he goes on to say that "[wihen the combat has an
ethical value it ceases to be play. The way out of this vexing dilemma
is only closed to those who deny the objective value and validity of
ethical standards." 4 Yet, as applied to the combat of lawsuits, this
solution to the "vexing dilemma" is itself vexing. For lawsuits are about
the value and validity of competing ethical standards expressed in legal
terms; they represent a social denial that such disputes can be resolved
objectively if what is done in resolving them is to be called justice."
Thus, when Huizinga turns to the legal conversation, those rules and
requirements of fair play-with which, he strongly concludes, civilization
must always be played" 6-are themselves in doubt. 7 And the ques-

8. See id. at 78-79, 84.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 76-88.
11. Id. at 76.
12. For a discussion of the rhetorician's views on written law, see generally Peter
Goodrich, Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIc 417, 422-23 (Thomas Sloane ed., 2001).
13. HUIZINGA, supra note 2, at 210.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 78-79.
16. Id. at 211.
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tion at stake is, often enough, which one of the disputants is Huizinga's
feared "cheat--"the spoil-sport shatter[ing] civilization itself."18
I point out this difficulty not to call into question any particular aspect
of Huizinga's good work, nor to question his foundational assumptions
about civility, nor even to ask which game it is in which they arise from
play. I wish only to suggest that this difficulty is why Huizinga could
not see the elements of true play that remain in modern lawsuits; why
he could not see those elements of the legal conversation that exert a
civilizing influence upon our culture; why, that is, he could not see its
play as justice.19 Huizinga was surely correct when he wrote,
We moderns cannot conceive justice apart from abstract righteousness,
however feeble our conception of it may be. For us, the lawsuit is
primarily a dispute about right and wrong; winning and losing take
only a second place. Now it is precisely this preoccupation with ethical
values that we must abandon if we are to understand archaic
justice.'
But he spoke more than he knew. For this preoccupation, in the form
it takes in his work, must also be abandoned if we are to understand the
current legal conversation's civilizing potential.
If we are to see this justice as play, we must try hard to abandon our
current assumptions concerning what the legal conversation is and is
about. Then we may be able to appreciate anew its formal elements as
a game: constitutive rules,"' a "lusory attitude" toward those rules upon
which the game depends for its continuation; 22 and, most important for
present purposes, its insistence upon a certain playful "disinterestedness"23 or, as I will call it here, an alterity or otherness, while also
appreciating its archaic Greek elements: agon, ritual, chance, and most
difficult of all, the remaining elements of sacredness and the divine.24
It is to this rhetorical task that after a few preliminary matters, we will
turn by way of the ancient Greeks. We do so not to define the legal
conversation by origins that may well be only the product of my
imagination, but to attempt to reopen our understanding so that we can
perceive the conversation anew.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See id. at 78-79.
Id. at 211.
See id. at 78-79.
Id. at 78.
See generally SUITS, supra note 3, at 37-38.
See generally id. at 38-40.
See HUIZINGA, supra note 2, at 8-9.
See generally id. at 4-5, 46-48, 78-79.
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I.
The tradition whose origins we will be exploring here is the tradition
of legal rhetoric, of legal casuistry, and of the emergence of a culture of
argument supporting the art of this casuistry. Before starting, and in
the interest of clarifying the distinction made above between law and the
legal conversation, we need to separate the lawyer within this tradition-the Greek tradition of the lawyer as advocate and the advocate as
rhetorician'-from the more Roman commercial tradition of the lawyer
as scrivener or, in its modem form, the transactional lawyer. 26 Of
these two it is the tradition of the lawyer as rhetorician that is dominant
in the United States and most merits our attention. The ethics of the
practice of law, including its virtue ethics and its ethical regulations, are
almost entirely based upon a conception of the lawyer as a zealous
advocate representing clients in the resolution of certain social disputes
and with the dual obligations of providing meaningful participation to
these clients while maintaining the conversation in which this participation can occur. We see this same dominance in the figure of the lawyer
as routinely imagined in popular culture; rare it is to find stories about
transactional lawyers even though it is possible that most modem legal
work is transactional.
This rhetorical and ethical tradition of advocacy, we should further
observe at the outset, has been subject to what Peter Goodrich describes
as antirrhesis attacks upon it. 27 These attacks arise when dogmatic
conceptions of the law spill over to nourish interpretations supposing
that the law expresses a truth (and typically a supporting theology) that
can be revealed and used without the need for true and fully human
mediation in applying it.28 Goodrich describes these attacks as
"belong[ing] to those epochs of legal rule in which lawyers have
misunderstood the relation of oratory to ethics and of theater to
legality."29
However, these attacks seldom have come from the advocates
themselves, 30 for whom a dogmatic conception of law would create
rather obvious daily difficulties in their work. Instead, the relationship
of their work to a theologically supported truth has been, I believe,
always more consistent with the model of Saint Thomas More, the

25.
26.
27.
28.

See, e.g., Goodrich, supra note 12, at 420.
See, e.g., id. at 423.
See id. at 424.
See id.

29. Id. at 422.
30. Id. at 424.
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patron saint of lawyers, than with that of Sir Edward Coke, whom
Goodrich uses to illustrate the dogmatic.31 This is to say that signs,
words, and images, indeed affective arguments of passion expressed so
physically that the persuasiveness of speech is returned to its pulmonic
origins, have not been for advocates "obstacle[s] to apprehension of an
invisible object of faith,"32 but instead, as George Steiner puts it in
describing Wittgenstein's work, "look[ing] out of language not into
darkness but light."' Such a hopeful conception of legal rhetoric seems
to me so central to the life of the advocate that I would suggest that
each reflective life well lived as one is a confirmation of it.34 There is
in Goodrich, as in so many modern scholars starting with Wittgenstein,
a discovery of something that practicing legal advocates have known by
life experience for a very long time, however rarely they may have
publicly expressed it as apology for what they do.3" Or so we will
assume here.
II.

The tradition of legal rhetoric has connections to theatre that
Goodrich, Kathy Eden, and others have recently made obvious to us

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. GEORGE STEINER, The Retreat From the Word, reprinted in GEORGE STEINER: A
READER 283, 292 (1984).
34. Lawyers as advocates have often insisted that the justice that is their responsibility
is in a world apart from the actual and that this justice is approachable only indirectly,
perhaps metaphorically, through the procedures and argued alternatives of adversarial
rhetoric rather than directly through dogma. See SIR HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW 52-53 (1954) (1861); Goodrich, supra note 12, at 421-22. Sir Henry Maine
describes these efforts including the substitution of the "superstition of the lawyers" for
that of the priests. MAINE, supra, at 53. This tendency of legal advocates, including the
Roman lawyers' persistent claim that the law of nations is the law of nature and has
priority over the civil law, might be described, in Aristotle's terms, as a lawyer's
professional insistence upon the priority of the realm of the ethical. See id. at 52.
35. This is not intended to disparage Peter Goodrich or these "modern scholars," but
to praise them. Indeed, Goodrich's work in this area is truly exemplary. For further
examples of his work, see PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW
(1995); PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC

MASKS (1990); PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
METHOD AND TECHNIQUES (1986); PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE (1987). There is,
however, a difference between us. For me, legal rhetoric operates as a restraint on
organized violence; as an attempt to recognize within our differences something
harmonious; and its performativity draws upon an authority that is not the product of
power. This is not just a sociological difference between us; it is a theological one, I
believe.
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again."6 These are the connections that I wish to explore here in order
to display legal rhetoric's literary nature, before going on to examine its
origins in play and game. After considering the similarities between
legal rhetoric and tragic theatre, with the help of Eden's and Eugene
Garver's readings of Aristotle,"7 we will turn to the origins of legal
rhetoric in earlier and more agonistic speech that is found in Greek
poetic gaming and Greek symposia.
I hope the reason for this is straightforward. While there were no
professional lawyers recognizable to us as such in Greece during the fifth
century B.C.E., there were professional speech writers available to
disputants in the trial of civil and criminal suits and an accepted custom
of unpaid, supposedly nonprofessional, "friends" assisting with the
argument. 38 There is little doubt that the tradition of legal rhetoric
emerges in part out of these trials, which like all political decisions of
the day were conducted before very large audiences of citizens selected
by lot.39 Yet there is a problem in seeing these trials as the origin for
the tradition of legal rhetoric. To be sure, the rhetoric best suited for
persuasion at these trials differed from that best suited for political
persuasion-witness, for example, the different requirements entailed by
retrospective and by prospective social judgments-and no doubt the
teachers of rhetoric of the time recognized these differences and taught
them.40 What we must account for here, however, is a tradition of legal

36. See, e.g., KATHY EDEN, POETIC AND LEGAL FICTION INTHE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION
(1986). Eden notes the primary sources for the rediscovery of the close relationship
between the tragic stage and the law courts. Id. at 7-8 n.1. Some obvious connections
between the two-both are staged, both are performed for audiences, both have involved
costumes, both require players who don masks declaring that their identity has
changed-will be treated lightly here or not at all.
37. EUGENE GARVER, ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC (1994).
38. ROBERT J. BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS: THE GENESIS OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, at v-vi (Benjamin Blom, Inc. 1969) (1927).

It is reasonable to
describe these "friends"-synegoros or "with speakers"-as lawyers, the way Robert Bonner
did in his masterful book. Id. at vi. But it seems problematic to do so. They could not be
publicly acknowledged as lawyers, and anyone appearing before the Athenian court too
familiar with the law had to explain himself before proceeding. Id. at 208-09. It is more
reasonable to describe these friends in other terms. The use of the term trial for these
proceedings is also questionable; a better translation is "impeachments," because the
disputes were heard by political bodies. Id. at 34.
39. See BONNER, supra note 38, at v; GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC & ITS
CHRISTIANS & SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT To MODERN TIMES 20 (2d. ed. rev & en].
1999). For a concise summary of this early history focusing upon the role of handbooks in
creating a discipline of rhetoric, see KENNEDY, supra, at 20-28.
40. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 1358b-1359a (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991) (noting
the distinction between jurors of past events and of future events as a way of distinguishing judicial from political arguments); see also KENNEDY, supra note 39, at 20-47, 86-88.
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rhetoric that somehow separates from the political to become the legal
conversation. This legal conversation, like the tragic theatre that it so
closely resembles, creates an imagined world, a separate polity wish,
standing apart from the political for its own purposes. The ease with
which the division between retrospective and prospective judgments can
be called into question should suffice to raise a doubt about whether the
difference in rhetorical needs between legal and political tasks was alone
adequate to create this new and separate rhetorical world.
We must wonder not only how legal rhetoric's alterity came to be but
also, and more deeply, how the judgments it produced came to be treated
as justice. It is for this latter question that we will turn to games and
play. After this we will use this exploration of origins as a tool for
seeing the legal conversation with eyes now more fully attuned, I hope,
to its elements of game and play4 and to its unique potential for
civilizing influence in Huizinga's terms.42
III.
When we use the word play to describe a Greek tragedy, we capture
something central to pre-Hellenistic Greek theatre. The theatre
provided its audience a certain degree of separation from the reality of
their daily lives. It did so, according to Eden, for a particular purpose.
The dramatists depicted tragic events in just such a way that judgments
about them were required.43 The "recognition" or "tragic discovery" of
a good judgment by the audience was the final aim of tragic drama.4 4
The audiences in their judging, however, also discovered rather than
invented a certain form of authority over their lives; and precisely
because it was discovered rather than invented, it was more persuasive
to them than other forms might be. These audiences, through the
"vividness of particularity" as presented in competing narratives, could

41. Elements such as constitutive rules, lusory attitude, alterity as well as ritual,
chance, sacredness, the divine, and so forth. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
42. See HUIZINGA, supra note 2, at 46-48.
43. See generally EDEN, supra note 36, at 7-61. This is of course not the only way in
which the distance needed for critique and then for judgment can be provided. Nor does
the distance need to be radical. It was the nature of the tragedies, however, to address
those social issues requiring the most distance because they were so, well, tragic. In the
tragedies the dramatist was often pitting the gods and heroes of one socially active cult
against those of another and risking great divisions in doing so.
44. See id. at 9-10, 61-62. This understanding of theatre is also prevalent in current
performance studies focusing upon social dramas, especially in the work of Victor Turner
relying upon the great German psychologist, sociologist, and philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey.
See generally VICTOR TURNER, FROM RITUAL TO THEATRE: THE HUMAN SERIOUSNESS OF

PLAY (1982).
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experience the tragic event for themselves.4 5 In doing so they could
come to know what they thought about it. Thus, the audience members,
like the audiences of parables for example, could discover the authority
of something they already knew to be true, and discover also that it was
something true about them: who they had been, who they were to be,
and, for the moment, the story of which they were a part.
In this brief, perhaps polemic, and very partial description of the aims
of tragic theatre, we may already see some of the similarities that, as
Eden also tells us, Aristotle saw between tragic theatre and legal
rhetoric.4 6 We may see as well, as she tells us Aristotle also saw, that
the best way of understanding tragic theatre was through its close47
similarities to-perhaps its modeling itself upon-legal rhetoric.
Aristotle wanted his readers to draw upon their close familiarity with
legal rhetoric as an analogy for understanding the methods of tragic
theatre, especially its use of poetic fiction as it relates to what he termed
the ethical." We will be trying to do the reverse.
The primary accomplishment of Aristotle's On Rhetoric,4 9 according
to Garver, was to see the art of argument."0 To consider argument as
an art, Aristotle tells us, we must focus upon the persuasiveness of the
argument as the measure of its quality and not upon whether the
argument in fact persuaded. 1 There are numerous reasons, still
internal to the art of rhetoric, why a persuasive argument might
nevertheless fail to persuade a particular audience. Thus, according to
Aristotle, rhetoric is the discovery within each case of the "available
means of persuasion" and not persuasion itself.5 2 What persuasion in
rhetoric seeks, what it is to be a means toward, is the belief of the
audience addressed as something that happens in speech and not simply
something that results from the means of speech.53 For this desired

45.

EDEN, supra note 36, at 74.

46. See id. at 4-5.
47. See id. at 9-24.
48. See id.
49. ARISTOTLE, supra note 40.
50. GARVER, supra note 37, at 36-37.
51. ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, at 1355b; see also GARVER, supra note 37, at 25.

52. ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, at 1355b. Aristotle says "observe" or "see" the means
and not "invent" them, id., although sometimes his definition is treated as if he said
"invent." To observe the means of persuasion within an event means that those means are
already there to be found in the event itself. This is the insight of a trial lawyer or a
dramatist or both.

53. GARVER, supra note 37, at 35. The ancient Greek word for this desired belief that
arises from methods internal to the art of rhetoric is pistis. Id. at 36. According to James
L. Kinneavy, "[A] substantial part of the concept of faith found in the New Testament [as
distinguished from that found in the Old] can be found in the rhetorical concept of
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belief to arise in speech, however, the belief must be intentional: that is,
the audience must know that it is being persuaded by rhetorical
argument."
As Garver points out, this does not mean "that the
speaker must be honest or open or that the audience cannot be deceived.
Intentionality leaves room for manipulation. " 5
If we are willing to accept with Aristotle that rhetoric is an art-an
aesthetic practice that, like all practices, has internal goods by which
good performance within it can be judged -- what are the particular
methods of this rhetorical art? Aristotle believed that if he could
uncover the particular methods of legal rhetoric, he could also explain
the fictional method and final aim of the tragic theatre by close analogy
to this method. 7 Legal rhetoric starts, as does tragic theatre, with
particularly disturbing human events about which there can be differing
and competing understandings. This very step puts legal rhetoric and
tragic theatre in Aristotle's realm of "the ethical," in which no generalities can be applied well.5" In this realm all norms must be adjusted to
the particular; each case, each agent, and each speaker must in some
measure be considered unique; all matters are thought to be variable
and subject to change; and ethos is important to understanding. 9
Always to a degree indeterminate, the world is to be measured, when it
becomes necessary, only by the relative mean, the fitting, and the
opportune.'
Given this, Aristotle asks, which arguments are best
suited to move an audience toward a belief about the event? 1 Such
arguments as will be the stuff of the dramatist as much as the legal
advocate.
Since Aristotle's concern was with the ethical, his starting place for
arguments is the quality of the actions taken by the various agents in
the event."2 For these purposes it is not enough to know what the
actions were, as it is in history, but also the how and the why of

persuasion, which was a major meaning of the noun pistis .... " JAMES L. KINNEAVY,
GREEK RHETORICAL ORIGINS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH 143 (1987). I believe this connection is
useful for understanding the meaning of the experience of judgment described here.

54. GARVER, supra note 37, at 152-53.
55. Id. at 160.
56. See id. at 19, 22-23.

57. See EDEN, supra note 36, at 9-24.
58. See id. at 35-36.
59. See id. at 35-53; see generally ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.K.Thomson trans., Penguin 1976).
60. Id. at 28-29, 44.
61. GEORGE A. KENNEDY, A NEW HISTORY OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC 57-58 (1994).
62. Id. at 39.
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them." To so understand an action, the audience must judge the
agent's choices by evaluation of her intention, and from this intention
her motivation, and from this motivation her character." But owing
to the obscurity of the past, the complexity of intentions, and the
uncertainty of future events, intentions are really unknowable.' Those
that we ascribe to an agent, including the (city) state, are always the
creation of a believable fiction."
What is crucial for persuasion in all this, Aristotle tell us, is character,
whether of the person or the state. 7 It is character that finally moves
us toward trust in the realm of the ethical, and it is really trust that
persuades when matters are indeterminate." We are moved by reason,
for example, because if reasonably used it leads us to trust the character
of the person reasoning. 9 Now, arguments toward character, Aristotle
goes on, are primarily competing arguments about probabilities within
"the fundamentally unpredictable nature of human affairs." 70 This is
the best that we can do in the realm of the ethical--other forms of
argument being too precise for the subject matter-and the best
arguments toward character, and thus toward persuasion, in both legal
rhetoric and tragic theatre are arguments about the probabilities of
human action. 7' Those that are most persuasive about these probabilities are enthymemes which depend upon audience
expectations about
72
our actions and our relations with one another.
We do not need to follow Aristotle further into his detailed analysis of
the types of enthymemes to get the point here. It is more important to
note that character (and in fact, the probabilities of enthymemes in

63. Id. at 48-49.
64. Id. at 39-40.
65. See id. at 39-46.
66. See id.
67. See id.; GARVER, supra note 37, at 149-54.
68. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, at 1377b-1378a; GARVER, supra note 37, at 145-54.
As one would expect with Aristotle, this was nothing other than the common wisdom
among legal rhetoricians about the central role of ethopoiia. See BONNER, supra note 38,
at 211. In this, indeterminacy is not the absence of a social identity; it is not emptiness,
rather it is potentiality and the possibility of becoming.
69. GARVER, supra note 37, at 149-54. It is important to note here that even logical
in Aristotle's treatment of the means of persuasion does not mean, as it might for us,
rational or scientific. See id. at 150. Instead, it too is a matter of the opinion of the
audience, i.e., does it appear logical. Id. If an argument seems logical, it is a logical
argument. See id. All this flows from the indeterminate nature of the realm of the ethical.
See id. at 150-51.
70. EDEN, supra note 36, at 43; see GARVER, supra note 37, at 146-52.
71. See EDEN, supra note 36, at 18-20, 35-37; GARVER, supra note 37, at 150-54.
72. See GARVER, supra note 37, at 150-53.
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Aristotle's sense) depends upon narrative and is persuasive-that is
elicits trust-because character is embedded in a narrative we believe
is true.7" Thus, as Eden puts it, "[T]he narrative ... , a part of the
speech particularly characteristic of legal oratory, in revealing the
choices of the agent, will simultaneously reveal his character."74 And,
she adds in words that with little change could easily occur in a manual
for legal rhetoricians:
It is in this sense that the plot is at once the arche, the telos, and the
psychi, or principle of motion, of the drama. Beginning with a plot in

the sense of a set of facts, an arche, the dramatist, through the specific
arrangements of the incidents and through the dialogue, qualifies these
events by making them the consequence of the characters' choices and
intentions, the motivating forces of action; as a result, the completed
play is not simply an action, but an action that can be judged according
to the standards of legal and ethical inquiry, as, in some degree,
virtuous or vicious, worthy of praise or blame. 5
So the legal rhetorician, using the same methods of poetic fiction as the
tragic dramatist, has made the individuality of the experience of the
event more demonstrable and, therefore, more knowable in a particular
way."6 Now the audience can see-indeed, experience-the event for
themselves in a way that permits them to discover their judgment about
it." This judgment is the judgment of someone who has "lived" the
experience, who knows it through aisthisis,78 and thus, it is to be
trusted in the way that the judgments of others are not.79 This is,

73. See EDEN, supra note 36, at 39-40, 53.
74. Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 53.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 74-75.
79. See, e.g., TURNER, supra note 44, at 75-77. Huizinga describes this for Greek
drama as follows: "The player, withdrawn from the ordinary world by the mask he wore,
felt himself transformed into another ego which he did not so much represent as incarnate
and actualize. The audience was swept along with him into that state of mind." HUIZINGA,
supra note 2, at 145. One can readily see the similarity to a trial. Turner describes the
same idea of trusted judgments concerning social issues arising from living through the
reflexive, liminal, and narrative experience of a dramatic performance of them. TURNER,
supra note 44, at 75-77. This is dependent, Turner tells us, upon Dilthey's conception of
experience, Erlebnis in the German. Id. at 12-13. On a related point, Aristotle said,
infamously for some, that the law's staging of truth was "wisdom without desire."
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1287a (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1944). Since it is
clear that he considers the emotions very much a part of the argument, this has been a
puzzle, but we may make sense of it thanks to the alterity created in legal rhetoric.
Aristotle perhaps meant a wisdom uncorrupted by the personal desires of the judges, who
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then, an ethical judgment about who we are that arises in an act of
literary imagination, and it is one that, for Aristotle, is "linked in the
human soul."'
What we have just described was for the Greeks the way to proceed
toward social judgment of right and wrong within the realm of the
ethical, whether the troubling event was narrated by "witnesses" on the
tragic stage or in the courts, when they wanted to be most careful about
it. This method, which seems so ordinary to us, was quite extraordinary
for the times and perhaps uniquely Greek.8 It is a method that calls
for opposing arguments, opposing evidence, opposing probabilities, and
opposing narratives demanding a form of judgment that encourages
consideration of not just a plurality of values, but values in direct
mutual opposition. From it arises the honored Greek legal traditions of
permitting anyone, regardless of the apparent strength of the evidence
and testimony against him, to present an opposing view in its best light,
and of postulating an equality among speakers for the purposes of the
argument regardless of their position within social hierarchies outside
of the court or the theatre. 2
The audience's judgment, premised upon tragic discovery of a fate and
an identity, thus arises out of the audience's fictional experience of the
event in the realm of the ethical. Notice that this judgment is not the
product of deliberative arguments about who we are to be. It is not
political: not the way within the polis that the polity was supposed to be
defined. This is true regardless of the form of the government and is
even truer when the government is radically democratic, as it was in the
fifth century B.C.E." (I believe this holds true throughout history.
There is no example, at least to my knowledge, of a government that
says, when faced with a political issue that will define it, "Let's put on
a tragic drama so that we can discover who we truly are and then act
upon that discovery.") And yet, while not political, what we have just
described does call into question the most central values of the polis
(indeed, its very identity). Rather than being the subject of deliberative
argument, identity has become a matter for the ethical judgment of a
theatrical audience. In this, as we can see, there is the creation of an

were to be moved not by their own desires but by the experience of the tragic performance.
Id. It is a form of wisdom-unlike deliberative wisdom and different from, if not entirely
unlike, practical wisdom-in which you do not desire an outcome and then move toward
it, but rather discover what you do desire in the experience of the thing itself.
80. EDEN, supra note 36, at 63.
81. See generally BONNER, supra note 38.
82. KENNEDY,supra note 61, at 9.
83. See KENNEDY, supra note 39, at 20.
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imagined and alternative polity-an alterity as we have been calling it
here-in which these judgments are discovered and in which the
authority resides upon which they rely.
This state of affairs should have troubled Aristotle profoundly. His
point, after all, had been to show that rhetorical persuasion in theatre
could be understood as using the methods of legal rhetoric in order to
show that the theatre could be of value to the polity just as legal rhetoric
could be." Yet it was not troubling. Now we think we know-we need
mention only the frequent censorship of theatre throughout history in
the name of security-that the theatre and the legal conversation could
be threats to the polity precisely because they have the alterity they do.
When the political claims that it is the polity, as the political almost
always does, this alternative polity of rhetoric, however it might be
understood, would seem unambiguously to need political control.
To understand why this did not pose a problem for Aristotle in the
Rhetoric, we need to notice that in the Rhetoric there is no listener's
art." There is nothing to tell us what is required to be a good judge of
legal rhetoric." There is nothing because Aristotle assumes that those
called upon to listen to legal rhetoric-the "dicasts," as they were called,
who performed as both jurors and judges in our terms 8 7-needed no
virtues other than those of the good citizen within the good polis.88 All
the roles within the legal system at the time were "scrupulously nonprofessional, and legal rhetorical arguments were addressed, as we
noted, to a very large number of ordinary citizens selected by lot 90 (and,

84. See supra text accompanying note 57.

85. GARVER, supra note 37, at 23. As Garver says, Aristotle does not address directly
the art of the listener. Id. He does, however, on one reading begin to imply one. For there
is a tension in the Rhetoric between Aristotle's encouragement of the legal rhetorician's
thoughtful use of the emotions and his apparent condemnation of dicasts who were too
persuaded by prejudices, anger, and the like. See id. at 104-09. This tension can be
reconciled by recognizing that what Aristotle wants from his listeners is a judgment on the

merits of the case presented, merits which would include a strong emotional component.
See id. at 109. What he does not want is a case decided on emotions that are not within
the merits. See id. If this is correct, then he was anticipating relevancy under Federal
Rule of Evidence 401, FED. R. EVID. 401, and the judicial balancing required under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, FED. R. EVID. 403.
86. GARVER, supra note 37, at 23.
87. BONNER, supra note 38, at 72-73.
88. See id.; GARVER, supra note 37, at 23.
89.

MICHAEL H. FRosT, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST

HERITAGE 59 (2005).
90. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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at a later time, paid for their services 9' to democratize the audience
further). Aristotle's Rhetoric, as we might expect, reflects this. In it
legal rhetoric is to be considered as subsumed by the deliberative and is
good only when and because it is in service to those judgments that
arose from the deliberative (which, given his assumption of an audience
acting as good citizens, it should always be). 2 He did not see the
alterity of legal rhetoric as a potential threat to the polity because he did
not think of it as separate from the political, but as fully subordinated
to it. 93 And he wished his readers to see the tragic theatre that way
too.

Aristotle's Rhetoric then assumes good citizens in a good polis
committed to the ethical, and to making judgments governed by that
commitment, as the precondition within which the judgments of rhetoric
are to be honored.9 4 Good citizens of course might have other conflicting commitments that legitimately prompt questions like these: Why
should I be persuaded by these rhetorical arguments? Why should I
reach a judgment in this fashion? Why on these merits as opposed to
others? Aristotle's response to such questions, I believe, would be to
appeal to the good of the polis, as the citizen's own good as well. The
decisive commitment is always the one that the virtues of the good
citizen within the good polis require.
We, however, are not permitted this assumption about the audience
for legal rhetoric. We are not permitted it even in our understanding of
the Greeks; for what is in question in legal rhetoric, then as now, are
those values by which the polity is defined. This is in tension, as Plato
knew better than Aristotle, with the political. What was needed, then,
if the tradition of legal rhetoric as Aristotle described it was not to
collapse into the political, was to bring the audience for legal rhetoric
within the tradition. And this is in fact what happened, although very
slowly and over many centuries.
But why did it? Why not keep legal rhetoric subordinate to the
political? Why should the political accept as authoritative, on the
subject of justice within the realm of the ethical, judgments arising from
what were essentially performances of tragedies? Why were these
judgments, however much we may appreciate them, to be treated as not

91. BoNNER, supra note 38, at 96. There were magistrates who acted as the chair of
the assembly, but they offered no instructions to the dicasts and did little resembling the
work of judges. See id. at 72-73.
92. See GARVER, supra note 37, at 23, 100-03.

93.

See id. at 76, 101.

94.

See id. at 23. This seems to be Aristotle's assumption for the purpose of argument

in the Rhetoric. It was not his observation of the way these dicasts performed their service.

532

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

entertainment but justice? Why that is, did we move slowly in the
direction of a professionalization of the audience that further separates
the legal conversation from the political one? It was, I believe, because
these performances, like those of the theatre, were closely tied from the
beginning to a certain tradition of sacred play in sacred games.95

IV.
Within many of the Greek tragedies (and the comedies as well) there
were competitive verse sequences, most typically questions and answers,
known as stichomythia." These were scripted, of course, but intended
to represent improvisations within a variety of very common competitive
poetic performances of both professional and non-professional kinds.97
Underlying these performances, according to Derek Collins, was a
widespread, inherited form of an ancient "basic response pattern called
'capping'" in which "one participant sets a topic or theme in speech or
verse to which another responds by varying, punning, riddling, or
cleverly modifying that topic or theme."' This goes on until one is
outmatched by the other "because no response is forthcoming, or because
the response given breaks the theme, or because it is just not considered
by the participants or audience to be witty or impressive enough.' 9
With ridicule of opponents as their most common theme, for these
competitions to be successful the external rules of acceptable discourse

95. If both theatre and legal rhetoric develop out of a sacred tradition of play and game,
why, we might ask, did legal rhetoric become justice and not theatre? It is a fair question.
For the Romans, "[tiheater, and in particular Athenian tragedy, threatened to constitute
a rival representation of the origins and laws of civic life"-a source of later antagonism
between them. Goodrich, supra note 12, at 417. And in some other cultures, as Huizinga
says, there is truly very little difference between the two. See HUIZINGA, supra note 2, at
76-88. There are, of course, various methods other than invocation of "seriousness" by
which to distinguish the two. Legal rhetoric, for example, considers only those disputes
that must be decided; it also insists, at least in the form that emerges from the Greeks,
that the actual disputants meaningfully participate in the presentation of the narrative and
in resolution of the dispute. See BONNER, supra note 38, at v; Goodrich, supra note 12, at
420. And there is little doubt that legal rhetoric, far earlier than the theatre, dealt with
matters of ordinary life directly rather than indirectly, as the tragic theatre did, through
creative and original adaptations of myths.
96. See generally DEREK COLLINS, MASTER OF THE GAME: COMPETITION AND
PERFORMANCE IN GREEK POETRY 3-60 (2004). The verse from Aeschylus at the beginning
of this article, see supra text accompanying note 1, introduces a question-and-answer
stichomythia. COLLINS, supra, at 27.
97. COLLINS, supra note 96, at 3.
98. Id. at ix.
99. Id. at ix-x.
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had to be "violated' by mutual consent.""° Given this consent, "the
internal rules [took] over, providing the means by which the players
[were] judged for victory."' ° ' These were, in other words, word games.
Around them developed a culture of capping, separated from other
cultures, with its own fluid methods for determining social hierarchies
within the game.0 2
Games like capping are self-justifying activities, to be played just
because playing makes the game possible.0 3 No reason external to the
game is needed, and nothing need follow from the play.04 Nevertheless, at times meaning in matters of social importance can be attributed
to the outcome of a game.0 5 When this happens, and the meaning
attributed to the outcome becomes an added reason for "playing" the
game, it does not thereby cease to be a game."~ Accordingly, it has
always been possible to play games about matters of social importance
(like the resolution of disputes within the realm of the ethical) without
these ceasing to be true games. 0 7
With this understanding in place, we can return to our discussion of
tragic theatre and legal rhetoric, in order to see if we can now trace the
origins of legal rhetoric to sacred games played about these events. It
should be said that what follows is not the product of serious historical
or anthropological research on my part, although I have tried my best
to seek out support, but is rather a "poetic history" as Vico called it."5
Here, I treat breezily matters that can be and have been hotly contested

100. Id. at xii.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 67.
103. See SUITS, supra note 3, at 144-45.
104.
105.
106.

See id.
See COLLINS, supra note 96, at 67; SUITS, supra note 3, at 144-45.
See SUITS, supra note 3, at 144-45. This understanding of the motivation for

playing games is from Suits. See id. When victory in a game reveals the judgment of the
gods, playing the game for the judgment of the gods (and the resulting cultural authority)
is a motive that supervenes upon the playing of the game and thus a reason for accepting
the game's constitutive rules. See HUIZINGA, supra note 2, at 78-79; SUITS, supra note 3,
at 37-38, 144-45. Yet accepting these rules because it makes the game possible remains
the only reason the players must have for playing a game, though not the only reason they
may have. Id. at 144. Thus, Suits says, he is "not committed to the position that playing
a game for some further purpose somehow falsifies the proposition that a game is really
being played." Id.
107. See HUIZINGA, supra note 2, at 78-79; SUITS, supra note 3, at 144-45.
108. GIAMBTTLSTA Vico, NEW SCIENCE 306-09 (David Marsh tran. Penguin Books 3d
ed. 1999) (1730).
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over centuries with the hope that for present rhetorical purposes, it is
enough to say "it goes something like this."'0 9
As we saw for Aristotle, disputes within the realm of the ethical are
different from other social disputes. They did not, however, begin as
different. Since we must assume that these disputes were initially
resolved by violence, like most others, there would not at first have been
any meaningful, substantive difference between the ethical and the
political. For both it would be tempting to say that might equaled right;
yet even this would be anachronistic, for it was not until "right"
developed later as a social matter that there could be any such
distinction at all. 10
There must have been in this world of violence an uncomfortable and
unsettling uncertainty. While it is true that victors often "forget[I to
treat victory as a transitory thing,""' such mistakes in such a world
only increased the odds that at some future point victors would, upon
exceeding the limits of their own power, come to see even their own
victories as a matter of chance." 2 With this they could, as Mihai
Spariosu has argued, exchange an aggressor's perspective for that of a
victim, and in doing so prompt a dramatic shift in values."1 3 The
primary effect of this shift, according to Spariosu, would have been that
power could be thought of as something to be controlled.""
We need not trouble ourselves here with all the ways in which social
control over power may have developed-we can see the fifth-century
results in the way the Greeks by then were resolving their political

109. For what follows I rely on a variety of sources, primarily works cited above by
HUIZINGA, supra note 2; MAINE, supra note 34; and KENNEDY, supra note 39. These works
include HARTVIG FRISCH, MIGHT AND RIGHT INANTIQUITY (C.C. Martindale trans., 1949);
MIHAJ I. SPARiosu, DIONYSUS REBORN: PLAY AND THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION IN MODERN
PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE (1989) [hereinafter SPARIoSU, DIONYSUS
REBORN]; MIHA! I. SPARIOSU, GOD OF MANY NAMES (1991) [hereinafter SPARIOSU, GOD OF
MANY NAMES]; ROBIN LANE Fox, THE CLASSICAL WORLD: AN EPIC HISTORY FROM HOMER

TO HADRIAN (2006); DAVID L. MILLER, GODS AND GAMES: TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF PLAY
(Harper Colophon Books 1973) (1970); GUY COOK, LANGUAGE PLAY, LANGUAGE LEARNING
(2000); TALKING DEMOCRACY: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RHETORIC AND DEMOCRACY

(Benedetto Fontana, Cary J. Nederman & Gary Remer eds., 2004); ROBERT WARDY,
Rhetoric, in GREEK THOUGHT: A GUIDE TO CLASSICAL KNOWLEDGE 465 (Jacques
Brunschwig & Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd with Pierre Pellegrin eds., Catherine Porter trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1996); and THOMAS R. MARTIN, ANCIENT GREECE: FROM
PREHISTORIC TO HELLENISTIC TIMES (2000).
110. See generally FRISCH, supra note 109, at 37-66.
111. SIMONE WELL, THE ILLIAD OR THE POEM OF FORCE 15 (Mary McCarthy trans.,
Pendle Hill 1956) (1940), quoted in SPARIOSU, GOD OF MANY NAMES, supra note 109, at 27.
112. See SPARIOSU, GOD OF MANY NAMES, supra note 109, at 27.
113. Id. at 2.
114. See generally id. at 27-55.
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disputes-for our concern is only with the history of disputes within the
realm of the ethical. As we noted, for the ethical to emerge, there had
to be some understanding of right distinct from might.115 There had
to be, that is, a willingness to accept an authority for right that was not
grounded in power and to which both or all disputants owed some
measure of allegiance." 6
The nature of divine justice among the Greek gods would not have
encouraged the emergence of the ethical, nor would the gods have offered
much of a resource for the control of power. Themis, the source of Greek
divine justice, was not truly a god; rather, Themis was a divine ability,
ready at hand to many gods, to render judgment." 7 Not being law, not
being governed by principle, not requiring consistency-not even the
consistency of deciding like cases alike-and thus, requiring that each
dispute be treated as the completely unique event it was, Themis would
have had the appearance of randomness and offered no order upon which
power could be controlled."' Zeus, after all, was "'not a law-maker,
but a judge,'"" 9 and Homer knew nothing of divine law-giving. 2 °
To be sure, divine justice would have been revealed after the fact by
doing battle. All that one could do to determine one's fate before battle,
however, would be to appease the gods as best one could.' 2' If one's
fate was to be known without battle, if there was to be some measure of
control over power, then some form of human mediation of man's
uncertain relationship with the gods would be required.'22 In other
words, there would have to be some way of invoking the gods' judgments;
some way of having their intent discovered; some way of coming to know
one's fate such that it could then make sense to say that some action
taken was right; and following this discovery, some way of confirming

115. See supra text accompanying note 110.
116. See FRISCH, supra note 109, at 66-67.
117. MAINE, supra note 34, at 2-3, 5.
118. Id.; see also FRISCH, supra note 109, at 37-49 (discussing the evolution from
themis to dike as the Greek word meaning "right").
119. MAINE, supra note 34, at 3 (quoting II GEORGE GROrE, HISTORY OF GREECE 82 n.4
(Peter Fenelen Collier & Son 2d ed. 1901) (1846-1856) (noting that "Zeus or the king is a
judge, not a law-maker")).
120. FRISCH, supra note 109, at 41-42. Zeus was not trusted to adhere even to his own
pronouncements. Id. at 65. The first recorded trial is in Homer, of course, but there is, I
think it is fair to say, no "law" in it.
121. FRISCH, supra note 109, at 51.
122. See id. at 51-54.
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oneself as being in the right."2 In all this, we can see elements that
would prompt the creation of the ethical.
This socialization of the justice of the gods, so to call it, would not
have been, I think, simply the political matter of avoiding the escalation
of violence that often accompanied private disputes, although certainly
it was this in some measure. Perhaps instead it came from a felt need
to claim being right as a matter of an identity not determined by
others-a public declaration that one's actions conformed to the
judgment of the gods."24 In this way, and over time, a wrong done to
one person, family, or clan could have been perceived not only as a
wrong done to the gods, but also as a wrong done to all within the
broader social grouping--even if others in that grouping suffered no
physical
harm-because they all would have come to share an identi25
ty.1

Of course, invocations of the gods' judgment could take many forms,
as Huizinga recounts. 12 For the Greeks, most if not all forms of
invocation were agonistic. 1 7 In all forms, however, with the development of an ethical realm what had been the gods' random acts of
judgment, legible only after the violent fact, could now become social
feats performed for the gods' approval and disapproval.'2 8 If this is
correct, then the motivation to know one's fate turned violence into
sacred cultural games in which the gods' judgments about right and
wrong could be discovered and acted upon in the realm of the ethical. 1 29 As we know best from the early example of Greek sacred sports,
if these performances were to prompt the judgment of the gods, they

123. There is perhaps something else going on here, for as Frisch notes, "fate" seems
to be a "strange notion of something lurking at the back of the gods, inexorable,
swerveless," and is then something that the "gods themselves cannot defy." Id. at 53. If
we see fate as connected to right or righteousness and these as connected to identity, then
something far more certain than the whims of the gods is being called upon to announce
this identity. See id. at 53-54. The "right" then of the ethical is given a status that
removes it from the wrangles of men as from the wrangles of the gods and thus an
authority over the political. See id.
124. See JU"RGEN MOLTMANN, The First Liberated Men in Creation, in THEOLOGY OF
PLAY 1, 57 (Reinhard Ulrich trans., 1972). JUrgen Moltmann saw in this, as he says

Huizinga saw, an origin for religion not prompted by human need. Id. The ancients, he
says, "represented themselves and their lives before the totally-other, the gods, in order to
regain a state of conformity with them .... " Id.
125. See FRISCH, supra note 109, at 59-60.
126. See HUIZINGA,supra note 2, at 76-88.
127. Id. at 76.
128. SPARIOSU, DIONYSUS REBORN, supra note 109, at 15-17.
129. See SPARIOsU, DIONYSUS REBORN, supra note 109, at 16; SPARIOSU, GOD OF MANY
NAMES, supra note 109, at 29.
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would have to be performed according to rule, ritualized, and made
sacramental in order to be considered invocations at all. 3 °
And so they were.' 3' If the gods were to speak in these games, if
power was to be controlled in this way, cheating at a game in which the
will of the gods was to be revealed would be not only prohibited but
considered a wrong done to the gods themselves. (It is precisely this
form of wrong that St. Augustine would later use to define sin, that is,
man's claiming for himself that which belongs to God.) 32 In this way
as well, games of right and wrong could become sacred performances
possessing an
3 authority over their participants that surpassed other
authorities."

From the time man learned to lie, and in doing so discovered that
words could be used to create other worlds,' words too could be the
means of competing within these sacred games. 3 ' They could and did
become their dominant form. 136 But how, once the materially certain
verdict of violence or of dice had disappeared from the games, could the
judgment of the gods be discovered within them? With words it was
difficult to know whether it was the gods who were speaking. How could
their judgment be discerned in word games? Since it was never possible
to anticipate what an opponent might say or where the verbal argument
might lead, elements of chance remained that were as attributable to the
gods as chance always had been.'37 Words, the Greeks knew, seemed
subject to a mysterious law all their own."3s At some point, however,

See HUIZINGA, supra note 2, at 78-82.
131. See id.
132. See generallyPAUL J. GRIFFITHS, LYING: AN AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY OF DUPLICITY
(2004) (presenting a magnificent analysis of lying as taking speech to be your own).
133. See HUIZINGA, supra note 2, at 78-79.
134. See generally GEORGE STEINER, Creative Falsehood, in GEORGE STEINER: A
READER, supra note 33, at 398-410. On the origin of thought in lying, see id., and the
130.

authors cited therein. For an entertaining popular account, see JEREMY CAMPBELL, THE
LIAR'S TALE: A HISTORY OF FALSEHOOD (2001).

135. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
136. See generally ERNST CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH 44-62 (Susanne K Langer
trans., Dover Publ'ns 1953) (1925). If actions can have an attribute to be described as
"right" or "wrong" then disputes within the ethical about these actions would seem to be
disputes within language. This is the primary reason language would become the
dominant form of these sacred games. As Cassirer and others have argued, our sense of
belonging to a community, a "we," is a creation of language. Id. at 61. It must be for the
assertion of a "me," an identity, is itself a creative act of speech. Id.
137. SPARIOSU, DIONYSUS REBORN, supra note 109, at 15; see also HUIZINGA, supra note
2, at 78-79.
138. See Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, in THE RHETORICAL TRADITION 44 (Patricia
Bizzell & Bruce Herzberg eds., 2d ed. 2001). We see this clearly in Gorgias, for whom
words were magic things with a unique power of their own. KENNEDY, supra note 39, at
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the judgment of an audience would be required. How could the
participants in a game fought with words, and those others willing to
attribute meaning to its outcome, be assured that the dispute was being
judged by the audience on its own merits, merits that were in these
disputes divine?
To understand how the Greeks secured their sacred games against
profanation, we need to return to capping. The basic features of capping,
as Collins tells us, were manifest in a wide variety of competitive verbal
performances, and those performances moved toward a Greek ideal for
poetic gaming in which the audience became central to our problem of
judgment.'39 The symposia were the competitive verbal performances
closest to what we have described as the games of resolving disputes
within the realm of the ethical. While characterized by "a self-described
notion of play ...

ultimately competitive in nature," they could also

"encompass order and a type of moral edification that other performance
genres, such as that of rhapsodes, [were] incapable of delivering." °
Around the symposia a culture developed as it did around capping.
This one was a culture of argument, in which argument itself could be
appreciated as the art Aristotle described it as being.'
It was
extremely important to the maintenance of the symposia that this elite
and aristocratic culture of argument be well protected.'
Verbal
contests within symposia, most especially those forms most resembling
capping like the skolion game,"4 "create[d] opportunities for 'real'
social hierarchies that exist[ed] outside the gaming context to be both
dissolved and recreated" within a system of social status that "fluctuate[d]" with the outcome of "individual verbal matches."'" Separation
from the social order was, however, a very risky matter for the
symposium participants. If the game went too far, insult could be taken,
and not only could the game itself become violent,'45 but an insult
directed at someone politically powerful could have serious repercussions
outside the game.'46 Other risks of politics arose during the game as
well if the participants became too closely associated with the positions
they argued. 4" At their ideal best, however, these were verbal perfor-

35.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
140. COLLINS, supra note 96, at 63.
141. See id.

142. See id. at 66-67, 69.
143.

For a discussion of the Sholian game, see id. at 84-89.

144. Id. at 67.
145. Id. at 71.
146. See id. at 78-79.
147.

See id. at 70-71.
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mances within a competitive game undertaken "in the service of the
greater communal good."148 And victories within the symposia were
not publicly acclaimed like dramatic or rhapsodic victories but were
announced "in terms that allow[ed] everyone who participate[d]
essentially to 'in. ' " '
For the symposium to honor its ideal, it was obviously important that
the game be separated from the political, from social hierarchies, as well
as from external animosities that might develop within the group. It
was also important that it be separated from attachments to particular
arguments other than as arguments admired within the game.
Symposiasts were expected to be able to argue playfully all sides of any
issue and trained themselves accordingly. 50 Gorgias' Encomium of
Helen, 5 ' with its antithetical manner, its exploration of the means of
persuasion on a matter of ethical significance, its use of what came to be
called Gorgianic figures for persuasion, and its intentional playfulness,'5 2 is perhaps the best example we have of a symposiast's right
attitude toward arguments. Although opinions on this may vary,
Gorgias appears to insist upon a neutral playing field for argument in
the interest of whatever discovery might be made when a matter was
cleverly argued on all sides.'5 3
To the best of our knowledge, the symposia made no distinction
between participants and audience."M The training the participants
received was also training to be good judges of the competition.' 55
Good symposiasts, like good athletes, could come to admire those who
opposed them, admire arguments well made against them, and thus
judge a competition on standards generated by the game on its own
merits."5 In this, symposia stood in marked contrast to rhapsodic and
theatrical competitions that appealed to all audiences, trained and
untrained alike.'
Perhaps we can see the beginning here of an ideal
for audiences of arguments about ethical matters of social importance.

148. Id. at 63.
149. Id. at 66.
150. See id. at 67-70; see also SPARIosu, GOD OF MANY NAMES, supra note 109, at 91
n.56.
151. See supra note 138.
152. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 39, at 34-38; SPARIOSU, GOD OF MANY NAMES,

supra note 109, at 91-92; WARDY, supra note 109, at 470-75.
See Bradford S. Woods & Peter Demerath, A Cross-DomainExplanation of the
153.
Metaphor 'Teaching as Persuasion",in 40 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 228, 229 (2001).
154. COLLINS, supra note 96, at 67.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 63, 66-67.
157. See id. at 139-42.
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Granted, the symposium ideal was elite, removed from the ordinary
social hierarchies, fiercely indifferent to the seriousness of the deliberative and extant power. 58 For these reasons, it could not have been
readily applied to the political for the control of power. It could have
been readily applied, however, to those word games in which by now
disputes within the ethical were being judged.
It should not surprise us to learn that dicasts came to be judged by an
ideal emerging from the symposia.'59 Evidently the most accomplished
symposiasts, like Gorgias-the ones with the most at stake in standards
of argument by which their performances could be measured fairly and
thus their art revealed-were those most sought out as teachers of legal
rhetoric." ° And, arguably, along with rhetorical skills they must have
taught other habits: respect for the importance of playfulness, the need
to distance oneself from the dispute so that the means of persuasion
could be discovered, an ability to admire opposing arguments well made,
a loyalty to the game in which arguments were admired, and a concomitant concern to prevent its corruption.'
The rhetoricians who had
learned their craft within symposia must have been teachers who taught
play and game, and in the process taught those things that were also
necessary for others to trust the game's outcome sufficiently for meaning
to be attributed to it. Remembering that this meaning was the
judgment of the gods, these teachers taught how to avoid profaning the
game. In doing so, they likely created students who would come to insist
on their role as players of a sacred game of competing narratives within
tragic dramas that were performed so identities, fate, and the will of the
gods could be discovered.
With this "poetic history" in mind, we can now answer those questions
asked at the end of the previous section. Performances of tragedy using
the methods of legal rhetoric became acceptable and authoritative means
of justice once they were regarded as the sacred game by which a divine
justice above human authority could be discovered in the resolutions of
disputes within the realm of the ethical, and a truer identity known.
Their permitted alterity was to be protected by using what had been
learned from the symposiasts.

158.

See id. at 66-67, 139-40.

159.

The homicide cases in Athens, where older and experienced dicasts were required,

may have been the first to approach this emerging ideal. For those most familiar with
legal rhetoric, this was the court most trusted to do justice because the cases brought
before it were the ones most fully decided on their own merits-these dicasts, one is
tempted to say, were the most willing to suspend disbelief.
160. See Kennedy, supra note 39, at 33-34.
161. See id. at 33-38 (discussing the playfulness of sophists and its relationship to their
pedagogy).
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We should also return to our earlier conclusion concerning these
judgments by tragic discovery, and remember their form. They were acts
of literaryimagination, which, we noted with Aristotle, were "linked in
the human soul."16 2 It is one thing, an archaic thing, to say that the
game in which this was done was considered sacred, tracing its heritage
to a chance that lies within the providence of the gods.1" It is quite
another to think of fifth-century Athenians, to whom we still sometimes
return for wisdom, as experiencing a connection between acts of literary
imagination and the divine. Within the sacred game of legal rhetoric,
however, when we say that a judgment was discovered, rather than
invented, we can now see that this discovery was the uncovering of an
identity to be honored. And this detour through alterity had produced
a unique retrieval of something that manifested a transcendence, but
one well within the experience of ordinary lives carefully considered.
This discovery came from the gods, to be sure, but Greeks of the fifth
century honored it not out of obedience or fear, but because who they
were was being expressed thereby, in a mythic language than which
they knew no higher.
So Huizinga is right. Right and wrong had become winning and losing
in a game.' Yet as I hope we can now see, the equation of right with
winning and wrong with losing, the willingness to call the outcome of the
game justice, is not something necessarily archaic from which we can
16
easily distance ourselves with our righteousness, as Huizinga put it. 5
It is not something threatening or strange, but something potentially
and interestingly descriptive of our current legal conversation.
V.
When, many centuries after the periods we have been discussing,
judges and jurors became role players within the sacred game, the
formerly idealized separation from the political and from power was
actual and complete. The game's alterity could now be far more radical
than it had been for the Greeks and for Aristotle. These new judges
were to "step outside 'ordinary' life [to] don wig and gown" and in doing
so were to be "transform[ed] ...into another 'being" so that they might
better judge the disputes on merits arising only from the game itself."
The jurors, over time, acquired an ideal character as well, one with its
own set of performance virtues. In order to be persuasive to competently
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163.
164.
165.
166.

EDEN, supra note 36, at 63.
See HUIZINGA, supra note 2, at 78-79.
Id. at 81-82.
See id.at 78-79, 81-82.
Id. at 77.
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performing judges and jurors, legal rhetoricians now needed to respect
idealized conceptions of these roles in their arguments and, thus, to
argue only on the merits as those came to be understood within the
game.
Of course, with the professionalization of judges came specialized
knowledge of the resolution of prior disputes, prior legislative acts by the
state, and other formal statements about who we are. Yet this
specialized knowledge only provided the consistency required for the
sake of what mattered more: that the judgment truly express the
ongoing character of the community. Arguments appealing to statute
and precedent were, at rock bottom, arguments about integrity,
faithfulness, fairness, and so forth. They were, in other words, also
narrative claims about the character of the community offered in
opposition to other narrative claims about the character of the community. The game remained the literary one it had always been.
It remains to be asked if the current legal conversation, the one with
this potential for a more radical alterity, is still a literary game within
this rhetorical tradition. We can, I hope, get more formal issues out of
the way rather quickly to turn to what is most difficult in the comparison. For if we are to understand our legal rhetoric in the way we have
described it for the Greeks, we will have to have some understanding of
the judgment of our judges and jurors as reflecting a "right" and "wrong"
entitled to being honored as justice in the way that the results of the
sacred games of the Greeks were honored. We must be able to see a
justice that is internal to the game rather than an external criterion by
which the outcomes of the game are measured. If we see our game as
seeking an external justice, it is a matter of Huizingan "righteousness,"167 and as he rightly observes, being no longer a true game it will
fail to civilize us as true games can."'
Before turning to this difficult task, however, there is the formal
question of whether it is correct to call what lawyers do now in the legal
conversation a "game" at all. Admittedly we have been talking about the
legal conversation in game terms throughout this Article. But perhaps
we should say a little more about this by offering a brief formal
description of what our lawyers do in game terms.
Lawyers seek to win' 69 Winning, for lawyers, is achieving that state
of affairs in which some authority decides the dispute between the

167. Id. at 78.
168. See id. at 210-11.
169. Parts of this paragraph and the next two come from Jack L. Sammons, 'Cheater!":
The Central Moral Admonition of Legal Ethics, Games, Lusory Attitudes, Internal
Perspectives,and Justice, 39 IDAHo L. REV. 273, 282-85, 302-03 (2003).
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parties by rendering a favorable judgment on a lawyer's persuasive
performance on behalf of the client. The persuasive means lawyers can
use are limited to those the game permits. 70 Constitutive rules of the
game, such as the rules of evidence, procedure, or ethical regulations,
determine which means these are. 7 ' These constitutive rules are
accepted with a lusory attitude by good lawyers.'72 They are accepted,
that is, just because these rules make the game possible. 7 ' (This is,
again, the reason all players of games must have, "but it is not the only
reason [they] may have." 74 All reasons they may have, however, must
be reasons for "playing" the game. 7 ') The ethics of the role of the
lawyer turn almost entirely upon maintaining this lusory attitude, an
attitude that is necessary to maintain any game as a game176 in which
it is impossible to say that one has won by cheating. 17 7 This game
depends for its existence, like all competitive games, upon a certain
cooperation among competitors, which in turn requires an ongoing
conversation, internal to the game and also constitutive of it, about these
constitutive rules, what it means to play the game well, and how to
avoid corruptions of it. 178 In all this there is a required attitude
toward other competitors that closely resembles the lusory attitude
required to be a player of competitive games.
The essential nature of this game is not changed by the fact that it is
being played for others. Clients come to this game, willingly or not, for
instrumental reasons, seeking intentional goals that its outcome can
provide: for example, get the money I am owed, stop the conduct I abhor,
permit the conduct I desire, avenge the harm, imprison the wrongdoers
to keep us safe, or avoid the imprisonment threatened by the state.
Instrumental reasons such as these always threaten to corrupt the game
because they offer no reason to accept voluntarily its constitutive
rules-no reason, that is, not to cheat. The lawyer, then, through his or
her lusory attitude and for the sake of the game, translates the client's
intentional goals into the playing of the game in a manner that the
client can accept. The way this translation is done is itself constitutive
of the game; it must be done through means permitted by the constitu-
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See SUITS, supra note 3, at 37.
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tive rules. The relationship between the player and the one on whose
behalf the game is played becomes itself a part of the game.
Clients with strong and strongly conflicting intentional goals-often
understood by themselves as principled differences- represent the
ancient risk of a return to violence. What the lawyer does, then, is what
the Greek rhetorician did: translate this potential for violence into a
literary game that is always a conversation about the community itself.
The lawyer does this, while keeping the clients together within the
community, by speaking to it for them. Just as before, what stands
between right and might, between justice and power, between conversation and violence, is a game. This game is only sustainable, however,
because of the willingness of others, most especially the political other,
to attribute justice to the judgment of an audience of judges and
jurors-people intentionally removed from the ways in which we most
commonly make our decisions. These judges and jurors are announcing
the discovery of a justice upon which we should act-that is, as having
some sort of authority over us. (Thinking in terms of international law
will make the attendant difficulties more obvious.) We come back, then,
to the task of trying to understand what we now do as something to be
as strangely honored by us as it was by the Greeks.
VI.
We have seen that the end of legal rhetoric was a "tragic discovery" of
a social identity in the resolution of a dispute within the realm of
Aristotle's ethical. This identity had the authority of something the
audience already knew to be true, and its truth was uncovered through
the vivid, fully human experience of regarding the event from all sides
that legal rhetoric and tragic theatre could provide. The rhetorical
methods used to persuade were grounded in fiction, we said, and the
discovery itself was an act of literary imagination "linked in the human
soul." We then asked why such a judgment, however much it may have
been admired or respected as one coming from those who have "lived"
the event, should be received and acted upon as justice by those who
wield power within the polity. Why did they not instead see the alterity
of legal rhetoric, implying as it did a separate and sovereign polity, as
a threat that needed to be kept subordinate to the political? To answer
this we turned to the emergence of the ethical, which we said, also
became a matter of social identity in the determination of right and
wrong. Judgments in this realm from their beginnings had the
authority of something arriving from a place outside of power and above
it, which for the Greeks was the province of the gods. This justice, we
said, evolved from the gods' random acts, through games of power
performed under their auspices-and later for their approval or
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disapproval, into games of words in which an uncertain relationship with
the gods was mediated by the judgment of human audiences, judgments
in which the gods' desires could be discovered when the game was well
played.
All these games were played to announce a fate, a story in which the
"we" at stake had a part, and an identity to be true to in the resolution
of disputes. Such sacred games were to be kept apart from other
matters so as to ensure that it was the gods who were speaking in them.
The persistence of this sacredness into a time when the games had
become the game of legal rhetoric provided the answer to our questions.
Acts of literary imagination "linked in the human soul" were linked
through the human soul to that which is divine in it. This was no longer
the gods' exaction of obedience through fear of their power, but their
speaking through an honorific mythic language in an agonistic,
ritualized, sacred literary game.
In this there was an important theological development, namely the
Greeks' discovery of a transcendence inherent in our own experiences.
This social immanent transcendence, if you will, makes it possible to
experience a transcendence in our judgments of right and wrong. We
can come to know--aisthsis again-things about ourselves from beyond
the ordinary, beyond the polity in which we live, beyond power, beyond
violence-indeed, beyond ourselves. The discovery of an alterity that is
truly other but nevertheless arises from our own experiences is a
discovery that we can be holy.
If this discovery is what is required for our justice to be understood as
play and game in the way of the ancient Greeks, and I believe it is, then
we have the daunting task of finding something as sacred as the gods
within something as profane as the legal conversation. I do not mean in
the lives of lawyers, or in the law, or in those things that both can
accomplish. I mean in the conversation itself, which is where it resided
for the Greeks. There are various ways of proceeding, some of them
beautifully explored by others who, for example, have rediscovered the
sacredness assumed in the language of the law.'79 Here, however, my
task is the broader one of trying to see this conversation anew, by
adding to our description of the legal conversation in game terms what
we have learned from the Greeks and asking if it continues to ring true.
What I will describe need not and does not always happen, but when it

179. See generally Joseph Vining, Donald A GianellaMemorial Lecture: The Mystery
of the Individual in Modern Law, 52 VILL. L. REv. 1 (2007) (presenting a wonderful and
moving article on the transcendent mystery of the individual carried within modern law,
and on the irreducibility of the word "person").
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does, it reveals for us, I believe, something central to understanding the
legal conversation."'
What lawyers do in advocating for their clients is model the social
conversation we should have with one another when there is a fight or
a mob just around the corner. This conversation offered in lieu of force
is, paradoxically, the one we most need at a time when the extent of the
difference between us makes any conversation unlikely. It is a
conversation insistently social: those who would join it must accept that
at issue are differences among an "us" and not just between a "you" and
a "them." This fight is still individually partial, to be sure, and the
contestants are to participate through lawyers in a meaningful way in
its resolution, but each party must submit beforehand to being conjoined
in at least an illusion of community. The dispute is for and about the
identity of a community to which each disputant is called and must
answer.
Although the foundational questions are always about who "we" are,
for the advocates not just any "we" will do. The persuasive appeal of
their arguments is always directed toward some particular conception of
the best "we" can be in resolving the dispute. The appeal then is,
inescapably and unsurprisingly, always a moral one. And, of course, the
narratives offered by these adversarial advocates are always conflicting
moral ones.
Our communities, like those of the Greeks, are very protective toward
this conversation about themselves. We are cautious about turning to
it too often, too quickly, for the wrong reason, or in the wrong manner.
We are very protective as well, even oddly so, of the sources upon which
we draw when making decisions about who we are to be in resolving the
dispute. We will turn to these sources, we tell ourselves over and over,
only when they are truly necessary for a decision that we cannot avoid
and cannot resolve on our own without them and only when we have
proceeded correctly toward them in accordance with the rules of the
game. We approach these sources with a certain reverence if you will.
And when we do approach them, the force of our lawyers' competing
arguments not only calls into question our identity, but also, odd as this
may seem, denies to us the resources we would normally use for
determining it.
Our lawyers' competing moral arguments move us toward a recognition of each dispute as a unique disturbance of our identity-an

180. Portions of what follows were presented at the University of Seattle School of Law
Symposium, "Pluralism, Religion &the Law: A Conversation at the Intersection of Identity,
Faith, and Legal Reasoning," conducted on March 7, 2008. My thanks to the participants
for their comments.
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anomalous situation that we cannot adequately address using resources
familiar to us from past usage-because it is our identity itself that is
in question. Thgether the lawyers insist that what they have to say for
their clients be truly heard as new, as unique, as coming from real
people, "real presences," singularities, and of great value because they
are so; and the lawyers do this by summoning all of those methods of
poetic fiction Aristotle described. It follows that, if we are to do this
right and do it honestly, we have to admit with Socrates that we start
in some essential way from a position of not knowing how to go on. For
the lawyers in their competing arguments display for us first the
limitations of the materials of the law for resolving the dispute, the
limitations of policy, reason, knowledge, and finally, the limitations of
language itself. They do so by making the dispute fully human which,
ironically, makes our community suddenly alien to itself so that we can,
with honesty, decide who we are.
The virtues we require of the legal audience offer confirmation that
making ourselves strange to ourselves-creating an imagined alterity-is
exactly what is going on. For our arguments as lawyers are offered to
those whose roles, as we have noted, require them to shed all prior
commitments other than those commitments that are necessitated by the
task of avoiding all prior commitments. The judge and jury, we say, are
to listen truly and, thus, to treat each case as unique-judge it on its
own merits. The judge and jury are not to think about the case
instrumentally toward some previously determined objective; they are
not to think about our identity as just the product of causes or capable
of full description on the basis of effects. The judge and jury are to do
nothing that would render the "we" whose definition is at issue static
and known, nothing that would render the "persons" appearing before
the court anything less than the singularities they are, and nothing that
would jeopardize the open and ongoing nature of the conversation. We
give the most credence, as did the Greeks, to those decisions that are
made in public in conscientious avoidance of these prior commitments.
All this leaves us with a puzzle: which resources-those resources for
decision-making that the community is so very cautious about using-are left for the judge and jury to rely upon in rendering their
judgment, the one that tells us who we are? Denied so many of their
ordinary resources--even in some respects the resource of language
itself-where do the judge and jury turn for a decision about who "we"
are, which the community has admitted it is incapable of providing for
itself?
Yes, it comes down to a matter of Aristotelian practical wisdom-this
mysterious improvisational creating that we constantly ask of our judges
and jurors and occasionally admire in them too. The judgment of
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practical wisdom that arises from this particular dispute between these
particular people at this particular moment is the one we trust the most.
It is then that we say all voices have been heard, and then that we
believe the decision, even if adverse, is entitled to our respect. But what
sort of wisdom is this, and what is it practical about? How can we know
it is both wise and practical when what it means to be wise and practical
is itself part of the question in dispute? Upon what does it draw if not
our commitments, reason, knowledge, or language?
In the fact that man raises analytical questions about himself and
opens himself to the unlimited horizons of such questioning, he has
already transcended himself and every conceivable element of such an
analysis or of an empirical reconstruction of himself. In doing this he
is affirming himself as more than the sum of such analyzable components of his

reality.1 8'

I quote from Karl Rahner, the Catholic theologian, although there are
many other theologians who have said much the same thing.18 2 For

181. KARL RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH 29 (William V. Dych trans.,
Crossroad 1982) (1978). We see something similar in the work of Wolfhart Pannenberg.
See, e.g., WOLFHART PANNENBERG, ETHICS 41 (Keith Crim trans., Westminster Press 1981)
(1977). I take the quote here not to mean that there is a separation of the natural from the
supernatural or a separation of a spiritual world from a non-spiritual one, although I know
that Rahner can be criticized for saying precisely these things, but for the proposition that
there are dimensions of our thinking that take us beyond "analyzable components of [our]
reality." And that therefore, we are, as Rahner says here, more than the sum of such
components. Our understanding of law must take this into account if we are to make sense
of the way in which we use the word "law." I have written about this more explicitly than
I do so here in Jack L. Sammons, The Law's Melody, 55 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
In doing so, I tried to stay away from claims of transcendence because of the confusion and
distance they can create. In the present article, however, I think the term is, despite the
confusion, the best way to connect our understanding of law with a Greek "divine."
182. For an example of another theologian offering a similar understanding of transcendence, and one relevant to my use of Rahner in the Article for he extends Rahner's
understanding of transcendence to a less subjective and more communal one, consider
Johann Baptist Metz. See, e.g., J. Matthew Ashley, Johann Baptist Metz, in THE

BLACKWELL COMPANION TO POLrrIcAL THEOLOGY 246-49 (Peter Scott & William T.
Cavanaugh eds., Oxford, Blackwell Publilshing 2004) (discussing Metz's work and its
relationship to Rahner's work). We do not, however, need to rely here only upon
theologians for Rahner's understanding of transcendence was strongly influenced by that
of her format teacher, Martin Heidegger, to whom we could also refer for this claim about
man being more than the sum of his reality although then the claim would not be
necessarily a theological one. For an good introductory discussion the influence of
Heidegger upon Rahner and the differences between them, see Robert Masson, Rahnerand
Heidegger:Being, Hearing,and God, THE THOMisT 455-88 (1973). For an excellent short

study of Rahner and his critics, see Derlan Marmon SM, Rahner and His Critics:Revisiting
The Dialogue, 68/4 IRISH THEOLOGICAL Q. 195 (2003).
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Rahner, this recognition of our limits is itself the original experience of
transcendence, the initial personal confrontation with the "holy
mystery"-his phrase for God-at the fountain of our being."
In the legal conversation as we have described it here, we may see
revealed a social version, a communal version, of Rahner's original
experience of transcendence. In the recognition of, the insistence on, our
own limits in the legal conversation, we see the beginning of a transcendence of them. We apprehend, as did the Greeks, an appeal to that
which is beyond us and yet arises from our experience. And in this
appeal, in this trusting of a transcendence, that which is beyond is not
understood as a void or a negativity, but as itself a real presence. It is
a trusted silence; trusted in our silence about it."M
Is there an irreducible "we" of community, as for Rahner there is of
self, that can be known only in a communal relationship to that which
is beyond it? Perhaps there is. Perhaps the Greeks and the centuries
that followed their path had this right. Perhaps the legal conversation,
pointing as it does toward a transcendence, reminds us of this. If so,
then the legal conversation offers us an alternative to all those other
conversations-the political, the social, the technological, the scientific,
the economic, the teleological, the philosophical, the utopian-that seek
to define us in some final way, to store our identity away for safe
keeping, to cabin it so that we can be controlled, to secure it for our own
security, and in all this to "de-sacraliz[e] it," as John Milbank says."
It would follow that other, instrumental descriptions of the legal
conversation-those returning it to force, reducing it to politics, science,
or economics, rejecting the idea of fictional truths, and denying the
literary nature of justice-reveal the potential threats of injustice that
they may well harbor. For each would corrupt the game, limit its ability

183. See RAHNER, supra note 181, at 60-61.
184. It would be wrong to think of this as our calling upon revelation for the resolution
of disputes. For what this references is not revelation, but an attitude towards revelation
that is itself revelatory. What this belief tells us is that justice relies upon virtues that can
best be understood as theological ones. See Sammons, supra note 181.
185.

JOHN MMBANK, BEING RECONCILED: ONTOLOGY AND PARDON 170 (2003) (emphasis

omitted). Continuing with Milbank, we can see that while this conversation is an
alternative to force it is one, in part, because it points to an ontology not of violence but of
harmonious difference-towards a peace in which difference, indeed tension, is relished as
it is, for example, in music. See generally id. at 26-43. It is, therefore, not at all a
conversation arising out of despair about the inevitability of our failing to live together
without violence-and not best understood as a necessary restraint upon violence-but one
that requires a patience that itself rests upon faith, hope, and charity. See Sammons,
supra note 181.
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to civilize, and threaten its continuation by making it, not sacred, merely
serious.
VII.
Huizinga tells us, "Civilization as a whole becomes more serious-law
and war, commerce, technics and science lose touch with play; and even
ritual, once the field par excellence for its expression, seems to share the
process of dissociation. Finally only poetry remains as the stronghold of
living and noble play.""
What I have said here about the legal
conversation suggests that the problematic change may have less to do
with the activity itself than with common perception of it. The threat
of seriousness, that is, comes from without this practice, not from within.
The legal conversation has not lost touch with play. It remains poetic
precisely in the sense Huizinga mistakenly reserves for law in archaic
cultures; the "formulation of law still [lies] in that exalted sphere of the
mind where poetic wording [is] the natural means of expression."'87
Like poetry in archaic cultures, the law "puts ritual into words, it is the
arbiter of social relationships, the vehicle of wisdom, justice and
morality.""

For the legal conversation to be so understood, however, requires not
only that we avoid Huizinga's "righteous abstractions" 8 ' but also that
we see how the game that is law creates and calls upon a polity other
than those of the political, the objective, and the real. It requires that
we see the law's alterity as the invocation of an undefined, because
indefinable, immanent transcendence which Huizinga describes as "the
sacred sphere" invoked by true play."9 To restore that sphere wholly
seems impossible, but can we, with Huizinga's help, see the legal
conversation as pointing toward it and appreciate why this conversation
can be the social alternative to force, to the falsely objective securities
that threaten to reduce us to things we are not, and to war in all its
forms-the fear of which seems to drive all of Huizinga's work? And can
we see that this is so because what is serious is not, as Huizinga asserts,
the moral content of our judgments,' 91 but the separate polity-known
to us through fiction-in which alone this moral content can be played
out as the game it is? Can we see that for us, as for the Greeks, this
justice's connection to the divine can only be played?
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